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Abstract.  The recent financial crisis triggered by the spectacular drop of the prices of 
financial instruments backed by subprime loans brought back into spotlight the role played by 
the credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the structured finance field. Their importance grew 
exponentially along with financial globalization and received a substantial support from the 
Basel Committee II whose newest regulations regarding the risks involved by certain financial 
assets were tied to ratings issued by specialized institutions. Throughout the time, the 
regulators took appropriate measures to ensure that the problems raised by the rating activity 
are avoided – loose competition, lack of transparency, potential conflicts of interest and 
rating-depending regulation.  
This paper tried to identify the main conflicts of interest which arise in the rating 
issuance activity and to outline the means that generate the potential incentives to exploit those 
conflicts; an important weight was put on the „reputational capital” theory which implies the 
fact that under the right circumstances, a reputation mechanism that works properly will deter 
low quality ratings.  
It tried to follow the correlation between the evolution of the legal framework and the 
impact on ratings quality, looking to identify remedies in order to avoid and remove conflicts 
of interest for this specific domain. Based on empirical evidence, the influence of conflicts on 
market informational flow was put under scrutiny and the long term implications on financial 
market environment were assessed.  
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Recent corporate scandals and dramatic falls of stock prices intensified 
investors’ worries and put pressure on regulators regarding the potential conflicts of 
interest within the credit rating agencies who, instead of providing market with 
accurate information, it had interest to deceive or hide them for their own personal 
gain.    
Conflicts of interest take place at the moment when a financial services 
provider or an agent within the firm use the information he has access to for its own 
personal interest. The experience gained by the rating activity along with the capacity 
of collecting and using the information provided by clients, gives CRAs a competitive 
advantage in the process of ratings issuance and offers them a special status in creating 
an informational flow in financial markets. Management & Marketing 
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Lately, conflicts of interest were put under scrutiny because a decrease in 
informational flow in financial markets leads to a distortion of its perception and 
jeopardize the process of channeling financial flows to the most appropriate 
investment opportunities; conflicts of interest also raise ethical issues for those 
involved in this process. They generate incentives for financial services providers and 
its employees to hide or provide false information thus hurting their own clients. 
Ratings play an important role in pricing debt instruments and assess if a 
specific issue is suitable to be part of a certain type of portfolio. Changes in ratings 
began to be used more and more as triggers in financial contracts, thus a lower rating 
can imply the need new collateral, an interest rate adjustment and even the termination 
of a contract. Policymakers use ratings as a method to determine the quality of 
institutional investors’ portfolios by assessing their risk exposure and capital 
requirements. Companies structure their debt so that they can achieve a certain rating; 
for this purpose, some even create special investment vehicles so that they can lower 




Alongside with financial system globalization in the last decades, the 
importance of ratings met a new demand. Ratings are grades given by specialized 
agencies which assess the creditworthiness of a company or a government and 
measures its capacity to meet payments. It can assess debt for various tenors with a 
range starting from the best quality (rating AAA) and finishing with the worst (rating 
D). At the beginning, rating agencies’ task was to assess the debt of companies which 
wanted to raise capital by issuing bonds on capital markets. These ratings’ main goal 
was to differentiate the financial risk embedded by those issues thus allowing 
companies with sound financial record to keep a low cost of its debt. Further in time, 
CRAs’ assessments became more sophisticated covering insurance companies, 
warrants and mutual funds. 
During the financial crisis in 1997-1998, CRAs were blamed because they 
weren’t able to identify in proper time the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets and 
furthermore because they were too much in a hurry to lower the ratings of the 
countries involved, thus multiplying the initial problems (Herrero, Gyntelberg, Tesei, 
2008). Enron demise in December 2001 was the one that brought for the first time into 
spotlight the activity of CRAs; Enron enjoyed investment grade rating until four days 
before it declared bankruptcy. Its business strategy and financial structures, especially 
the out-of-balance-sheet investment vehicles, were focused only on maintaining a high 
rating (Mishkin, Stanley, 2006). US Congress Committee in charge with investigating 
Enron bankruptcy concluded that CRAs showed „… a disappointing lack of 
involvement in assessing and managing company’ risks…”  
As a consequence, US government passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act which 
mandated US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue The Role and  Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies 
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Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets. This 
report has two parts: 
￿  The first part identifies the potential sources of conflicts of interest within 
CRAs (SEC, 2003); 
￿  The second part proposes possible remedies for those conflicts (SEC, 
2003).  
The conclusions of the report were the fundament for the further regulations 
within the rating activity and tried to answer the following questions: 
￿  Should CRAs make public more information regarding the fundaments 
their decisions or the creditworthiness of the companies rated? 
￿  Should improved procedures be put in place in order to prevent and 
eliminate potential conflicts of interest? 
￿  Should ratings be taken into consideration when issuing new regulation? 
￿  Should the current regulations regarding CRAs be changed? 
  CRAs play an important role in decreasing information asymmetry on the 
capital markets. These asymmetries take place due to the fact that potential investors 
lack the information or the capacity to asses properly the creditworthiness of the 
issuers. The issuers know all the details about the financial instruments they want to 
sell but they don’t want to share them with the potential investors. 
CRAs act as delegate monitors for the investors; some of their main 
advantages are as following: 
￿  They can allocate more resources than individual investors and they have 
the expertise in assessing the creditworthiness of the issuers; 
￿  They have access to information which are not available to the general 
public; 
￿  If they are perceived as independent their ratings will have a bigger 
influence on the market. 
If CRAs are used by a bigger number of investors, they can avoid a part of the 
costs involved by multiplying the information. If each individual investor will be 
capable of performing the proper analysis, it will be a waste of resources from the 
social standpoint. Companies are willing to share confidential information with CRAs 
based on the assumption that the last ones, taking into account the fact that they don’t 
own shares of that respective company will use the information only to set up the 
proper rating for the company, rating which will be available for all the market 
participants at the same time. The lack of direct financial involvement makes CRAs’ 
reports more valuable and a good reputation is a premise for an independent and 
correct assessment of the soundness of a financial institution. 
  Before 1970, CRAs revenues were exclusively obtained from the 
subscriptions of those willing to acquire data regarding companies’ ratings. In 1970’s, 
main CRAs began asking for fees from those who wanted their issues to be rated. The 
answer to the question if there are real conflicts of interest in this way of conducting 
business can be found in the information asymmetry problem. Technological changes, 
like the possibility of making photocopies at a very low cost, made relatively easy Management & Marketing 
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information distribution. Market participants were capable of acquiring information 
regarding various ratings without having to pay for it; “free-rider” problem became a 
widespread issue. Following these facts, CRAs weren’t able to get the same amount of 
revenues from selling the information regarding the ratings they issued; the solution of 
the problem was to ask issuers to pay for the ratings, a business model that still stands 
nowadays. 
CRAs were always perceived as an important tool in the hand of investors; 
ratings were used by investors as methods of evaluating the soundness of financial 
instruments they were interested in. The debtors, so-called blue-chips, are the potential 
beneficiaries of a functional rating system; as long as information asymmetry exists, 
the blue-chips debtors will face problems in certifying the quality of their liabilities 
and will be forced to pay a premium to the investors to compensate for the uncertainty 
that dominates this issue. An independent and reliable assessment will allow this 
quality to be certified thus lowering the cost of financing. There might be an incentive 
for the issuers of medium quality instruments not to put that much weight on the rating 
process; once a high quality issue has been rated, all the issuers whose instruments fall 
below this category will not be interested in having them rated. The regulators, as part 
of the oversight of financial intermediaries, have taken action to ensure that the rating 
process works properly. They want to monitor financial intermediaries so that: 
￿  The risks taken by the last ones are properly assessed, managed and 
disseminated; 
￿  There is sufficient capital to cover the risks and protect certain classes of 
investors (e.g. savings accounts owners). 
  A rating has the advantage of being the simplest modality of an independent 
assessment of financial creditworthiness. This advantage will be useless if the 
information acquired will not be trusted when:  
￿  CRAs will duplicate information obtained from other sources; 
￿  Their assessment will be biased; 
￿   The confidence in these assessments will come due to a special status 
given by regulators, thus hurting CRAs’ independence. 
  When assessing the creditworthiness of a company, information asymmetry 
implies the fact that both issuer and investor have a common interest in rating that 
specific issue. Even though only issuers pay for this service, at the moment when it 
benefits from a standardized rating, the investors are willing to accept a lower yield; 
thus the issuers can use the difference to pay for the services provided by the rating 
agencies.  
Even though the above mentioned arguments explain how rating agencies did 
manage to replace the business model based on subscriptions with the one based 
solely on fees paid by issuers, they cannot explain with accuracy the following 
evidences: 
￿  Why the main agencies (Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s) keep rating 
almost all issues outstanding irrespective to whether they were made on a 
contract basis or free of charge;  Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies 
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￿  Why almost 98% of the issuers whose issues were rated paid for this 
service
1 (Crocket, Harris, Mishkin, White, 2003). 
A reasonable explanation could be that issuers are afraid that lack of fees will 
imply a lower rating. SEC reported that series of cases where CRAs were charged for 
using their privileged position in their relationship with certain issuers in order to 
determine the latter to pay for rating services; in the end, there were no convictions in 
this respect. Even in the absence of this kind of behavior from CRAs there are some 
other reasons that made issuers pay for ratings; we mention here the case when a 
company has knowledge of some information that favors its future issues but is not 
capable or unwilling to make it public. When this information is sent to a rating 
agency, the last one will have a positive feedback by issuing a favorable rating, 
without sharing that confidential information with the market. The companies which 
pay for ratings will have access to future similar services and, by supplying additional 
information, will positively influence further ratings.  
Another aspect worth mentioning is the legal framework set up by the 
policymakers regarding CRAs activity and the certifications an agency will have to 
obtain in order to activate within this field. Even though at the very beginning there 
were no formal regulations regarding rating process, once the market developed a new 
type of risk evolved: rating shopping. In 1975 SEC introduced the “nationally 
recognized statistical rating” concept; the fact that some agencies got this recognition 
influenced the competitive structure of the industry. At this moment there are only 
three agencies descending from those established a century ago; this degree of 
concentration is a reflection of the benefits of economies of scale and scope and it 
reflects industry’ access barriers.  
Just because at this moment ratings are heavily used and the issuers are 
willing to pay to use them doesn’t necessary imply the fact that CRAs bring new value 
by offering these services. Market practices and regulatory oversight can generate a 
high demand for ratings but this is independent of the effective value of the ratings. In 
analyzing CRAs contributions some other methods of assessing the quality of the 
ratings should be used; one of them could be rating accuracy. A rating is a method 
which assesses the probability that an entity will meet its payment obligations and the 
correlation between ratings and historical default probabilities represents one of the 
main methods of assessment. Evidence (Federal Deposit Insurance Company Working 
Papers Series, 2002) suggests the fact that, in spite of cases like Enron, there is a close 
connection between ratings and default probabilities. As we can see in the table below, 
default probabilities are inverse correlated with ratings (the higher the rating, the lower 


















rate in 2000 (%) 
AAA  0.00  0.01 
AA+  0.00  0.02 
AA  0.00  0.03 
AA-  0.03  0.04 
A+  0.02  0.05 
A  0.05  0.07 
A-  0.03  0.09 
BBB+  0.13  0.13 
BBB  0.22  0.18 
BBB-  0.29  0.31 
BB+  0.57  0.53 
BB  0.89  0.93 
BB-  1.14  1.57 
B+  2.66  2.64 
B  8.46  4.46 
B-  10.19  7.52 
Source: Brand, Bahar, 1999, p. 15; Wyman & Company, 2000, p. 29. 
 
In spite of these evidences, the above correlations cannot assess the value of 
the information provided by CRAs:  
￿  In the first place, these correlations don’t show how much ratings add 
value on top of some other indicators of credit quality (e.g. interest rate 
spreads or analysts’ research). Some analysis show the fact that their value 
added can be even smaller taking into account the fact that few 
professionals are involved in rating process (at Moody’s, an analyst is in 
charge with no less that 35 issues) (Partnoy, 1999); 
￿  In the second place, while the rating is a reflection of default risk at a 
certain moment in time, the correlation between ratings and default 
probabilities can change over time thus making rating more and more 
inaccurate. If a rating should assess default probability, their correlation 
should be stable. 
A sound proof that the market values ratings can be found in the way it reacts 
to rating changes. If ratings offer additional information to that already existed in the 
market and reflected in the actual capital market prices, is to be expected that market 
will act accordingly to changes in ratings; as we can see in the below table, ratings are 
not even distributed for changes in ratings (Jorion, Zhang, 2006): 
 
 




Ratings distribution  
 
Rating decrease  Rating increase  Rating 
category  Starting from   No.  %  Starting from   No.  % 
1  AAA and AA  46  3.85       
2 A  182  15.23  A  38  10.53 
3 BBB  238  19.92  BBB  74  20.50 
4 BB  155  12.97  BB  97  26.87 
5 B  388  32.47  B  125  34.63 
6  Below B  186  15.56  Below B  27  7.48 
Total   1.195  100.00    361  100.00 
 
In the case of rating decrease, 15.56% of the sample is rated below B; similar, 
the percentage is 7.48% for rating increase. In fact, for more accuracy, the comparison 
should be made between a decrease of a certain category and an increase of the next 
inferior one. For example, taking into consideration a decrease from B to CCC, the 
equivalent is from CCC to B and the respective percentages are 32.47% for decrease 
and 7.48% for increase. 
Another problem which arises is that of the reciprocal influence between 
rating change and the quality of an issue; a rating decrease doesn’t necessary means a 
lowering in the creditworthiness of an issue but it may for sure be a cause a future 
increase in the cost of debt for the respective company. We have to take into account 
that in last years ratings were used as covenants in some issues and a change in rating 
can lead to a change in the underlying contract; these triggers played an important role 
in the bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom. A rating decrease will lead to a 
worsening perspective on the creditworthiness of a company more than a gloomier 
forecast will do after being identified by the rating agency and disseminate to the 
market.  
A powerful example regarding ratings influence is the one from 1982, when 
Moody’s tripled the number of outstanding rating categories adding „+” and „-” as 
suffixes to its existent ratings (Liu, Seyyed, Smith, 2003). Even though falling into 
one of the new categories didn’t mean an effective change in creditworthiness of the 
respective issues, the market perceived the change as a flow of new information in the 
market. This perception determined price fluctuation on capital markets which stands 
a strong proof that market values ratings. 
Potential conflicts of interest in rating industry are created by the fact that 
there are several end users of ratings whose interests can diverge on the short run. 
Investors are interested in unbiased assessments of new issues while issuers are 
interested in favorable ratings that will allow them to get a cheaper cost of financing. 
Regulators are interested in: 
￿  A stable correlation between ratings and default probabilities; 
￿  Avoiding moral hazard; 
￿  Promoting a competitive environment. Management & Marketing 
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Rating agencies, as profit focused entities, have their own interest in 
maximizing profits and market share, which creates itself a potential conflict of 
interest. As mentioned previously, the business model based on fees represents a 
conflict of interest; CRAs could be susceptible of according favorable ratings in quest 
for new sources of income. Taking into account that the majority of bond issues are 
rated and disseminated to the market even if issuers didn’t ask or pay for it, the 
following question is raised: for what do issuers think they pay fees? Only the idea of 
a charging a fee in exchange for favorable rating would jeopardize CRAs activity by 
hurting their reputation. 
There is a low probability that a conflict of interest will show up that 
obviously to the market, like we can see in the following example (Butler, Rodgers, 
2003). In 1992 Jefferson County - Colorado School District case draw public attention 
regarding potential conflicts of interest within rating agencies. In October that year 
Jefferson County hired Standard & Poor’s to rate its new bond issue; the rating given 
was AA. At the same time, Moody’s gave an A2 unsolicited rating, rating which was 
far lower than that given by Standard & Poor’s. As a consequence, Jefferson County 
brought Moody’s in court, claiming that the last one issued an unsolicited report 
containing an inferior rating following the fact that their services weren’t demanded. 
Jefferson County asked for charges amounting $770.000, the equivalent of the 
additional cost of financing of the respective issue. Moody’s rejected all charges 
claiming that according to the Fifth Amendment has the right to freely express its 
opinion even though this might affect the business of a company. SEC initiated an 
inquiry to verify if Moody’s action was strictly addressed to Jefferson County or was a 
common practice within the agency. One of the measures taken by SEC, following an 
investigation of the US Department of Justice, was that CRAs were forced to make 
public whether the ratings were solicited or not. 
We can identify two mechanisms that can generate conflicts of interest: 
￿  The first one is tied to analysts compensations; they are paid in respect 
with the volume of ratings they issue thus being stimulated to rate as 
many issues as possible which can lead to a lax attitude regarding rating 
process; 
￿  The second one is tied to the bias analysts have when rating an issue 
after the financial stimulus has disappear. Within an experiment (Butler, 
Rodgers, 2003), an agent was involved in a transaction as a supporter of 
one part and then placed in a position where it didn’t have direct 
financial involvement and asked to judge objectively. The evidence 
showed that the agents tend to adopt o position favorable for the part 
they initially worked for. 
Another potential source of conflicts is that CRAs started providing auxiliary 
services like debt structuring, services whose main goal is to lower the cost of 
financing; these services are similar to those provided by audit firms. CRAs began 
experimenting this field as a result of the increase demand from companies looking to 
structure its debt so it can achieve a higher rating. If CRAs are paid for these kinds of  Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies 
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services and at the same time they are rating providers, they will be put in the situation 
of evaluating their own work.  
A conflict of interest can be found in the weight put by the existing legislation 
on ratings seen as standardized methods of evaluating creditworthiness of a company. 
In the race for the best rating, issuers are tempted to choose the agency that offers then 
the highest one (White, 2004, p. 8). For agencies, the weight put on ratings as 
benchmarks for financial contracts shows their importance and recognize the value of 
their work. On the other hand, using ratings as contracts covenants can imply too 
much importance given to this kind of assessment, putting their accuracy and 
efficiency on the second plan.  
The degree of concentration of the industry is a possible source of conflicts. In 
US for example, there are few agencies recognized by the supervisory forum 
(Vincentelli, 2007, p. 16) and, out of those, two have a significant market share: 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Service. The combination between the 
economy of scale and regulatory requirements is in favor of the oligopoly created by 
these two agencies and represents a barrier hard to overcome by competitors.  
Scarce competition has double effect in the industry: 
￿  On one side, it reduces conflicts of interest because the agencies, by 
lacking competition, will be less under the presure of gaining market 
share; aditional clients are to come if agency’s reputation remains intact; 
￿  On the other side, as long as they have a strong position within the 
industry, agencies might not have the strongest incentives to provide 
clients with the best services. They could allocate less resources in the 
rating process (calitative and quantitative) than their fees will worth. 
Agencies’ profit margin is very big (almost 50% in Moody’s case) which 
allow us to see a gap between the services provided and fees paid for it.  
The recent global financial crisis which started in the middle of 2007 had its 
roots in the US subprime crisis and threatened the financial stability of the main 
investment bank in US (e.g. Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs etc), 
of some European banks (e.g. Fortis, ABN Amro etc), of the biggest insurance 
company (e.g. AIG) and to a series of financial institutions whose main field was 
providing mortgages (e.g. Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, Northern Rock etc.), thus starting 
a spiral of negative expectations followed by a dramatic fall of stock exchange indices.  
The subprime loans were the product of the demand for financing from people 
with bad loan record and carried a higher interest rate than the average loans; the 
higher interest rate charged is a reflection of the higher default probability. The 
outstanding volume of the subprime loans was estimated to $1.300 billion. In 2007, 
the subprime loans amounted roughly 6.8% of the mortgage market (the percentage 
was 10% between 2001 – 2003 and 18% – 21% between 2004 – 2006) 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_mortgage_crisis). Only between October 2007 
– March 2008 CRAs downgraded a series of mortgage back securities whose value 
was around $1,9 billion as seen in the graph below.  
 Management & Marketing 
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Scaderile ratingurilor instrumentelor ce aveau 
























Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_rating_agencies_and_the_subprime_crisis, Accessed 
on April 12, 2009 
Figure 1. Decreases in ratings of mortgage backed securities 
 
Until July 2008, Standard & Poor’s downgraded 902 tranches of financial 
instruments and collateralized debt obligations backed by American mortgages which 
originally carried AAA rating; following this action, for 466 out of those instruments, 
the new rating attached was a speculative one.  
A study issued by Fitch showed that 97% of debt structures defaults were 
among companies with US background (Mason, Rosner, 2007). The outstanding 
volume of US mortgages owned by persons with bad loan record grew from $35 
billion in 1994 to $625 billion in 2005. The brokerage fees of the companies that 
structured, sold and traded these instruments were huge, thus implying that rating 
agencies took their part of the profit. For example, Moody’s revenues grew from $159 
million in 2000 to $705 million in 2006, most of the part due to debt structuring 
services (McLean, 2007).  
The hearings of the oversight committee of the rating agencies revealed that 
the top managers of the main agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – 
earned bonuses in 2008 of around $80 million while the ratings issued by the 
companies they lead deceived investors whose wealth was reduced by billions of 
USD. The value of the mortgage backed securities with AAA rating, considered to be 
the safest one, drop with 70% between January 2007 and December 2008 (London 
Summit, 2009). 
Confidential reports analyzed by the Waxman Committee and made public 
during the hearings of the oversight committee of rating agencies indicate that 
agencies’ executive members were aware all the time of the precarious value of the 
Quarter
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ratings issued. An internal email from an employee of a rating agency stated that “…it 
could be structured by cows and we would rate it” and „…let's hope we are all 
wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters” (Pelosi, 2008). 
Investment banks that securitized these high-risk carrying loans looked for 
solutions to get rid of them out of their balance sheets and the most appropriate 
investors found were pension funds and insurance companies; one drawback of the 
deal is that the last ones could only invest in instruments which carry an investment 
grade rating. To meet this requirement, a series of mortgage backed securities were 
created, their success depending only on the rating they carried. CRAs role became 
crucial in this process and they got more involved taking into account that they were 
charging fees from issuers to get their issues rated. 
CRAs role wasn’t a passive one and limited in expressing only an opinion on 
the creditworthiness of an issuer. According to them (Lacroix, 2007), their role was an 
iterative and interactive one and consisted in informing issuers on the requirements 
needed to achieve the desired ratings for their issues and, on a broad measure, the 
recommendation of a debt structuring that help issuers in getting the desired rating. In 
other words, CRAs helped issuers to obtain ratings that will allow them to sell the 
instruments to unadvised institutional investors.  
„These fears can be justified only in a market where there are an important 
number of players which will lead to a more relaxed approach towards rating process 
in order to attract customers. As long as there are strict defined criteria of authorizing 
and regulating CRAs and a proper monitoring from specialized institutions, we 
believe that an objective assessment can be ensured to reach a higher professional 
standard. Thus it is less likely to believe that big international companies, like Coface, 
will risk their reputations by issuing ratings unrelated to the real creditworthiness of a 
debtor” was Coface answer, the only CRA with a subsidiary in Romania, to the fears 
of European Union regarding the efficiency of the rating agencies’ business model 
based on fees (Vasilache, 2008).  
In November 2008 the European Commission approved the reform which 
stated that all CRAs that activate on European territory will be forced to adopt 
Brussels’ regulatory requirements. Alongside with the obligation of disseminating the 
methodologies, models and hypothesis assumed when assessing the creditworthiness 
of a debt, the agencies will also be under the supervision of a series of monitors 
appointed by the European Commission. CRAs will have to prove that there are no 
conflicts of interest involved when performing a rating process and to make public 
which are the first 20 clients ranked by the amount of fees paid. The new directive will 
also ban CRAs in providing consultancy services, thus Europe making the first step 
without waiting for Washington’s one. “The new regulations were made in such a way 
so that they can insure high quality ratings which will be conflicts of interest free” 
European Committee stated while raising subjectivism charges on agencies like 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch.  Management & Marketing 
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 „Rating agencies will need authorizations if they want to operate on EU 
territory; the existing regulations, voluntarily accepted by companies, are insufficient. 
I want Europe to be pioneer in the field. These rules are necessary for reestablishing 
market confidence towards rating process” said EU Competition commissioner 
Charles McCreevy, in a statement where it added that each of the 27 EU members will 
assign an authority to implement this regulation (Gow, 2008). Under the new rules, 
agencies will be made responsible for their publicly released opinions and could face 
EU sanctions when unprofessional behavior in the rating process is proven; in order to 
become a law, the proposal needs European Parliament vote. 
In the local market these issues were handled by the National Securities 
Commission who issued a series of instructions which, in conformity with the 
Commissions’ Act no. 297/2004 regarding capital markets establishes the criteria 
rating agencies have to meet in order to be able to assess financial creditworthiness 
and to rate financial instruments or issuers on the Romanian capital markets (Official 
Monitor no. 515, 2007): 
￿  Quality and integrity of the rating process; 
￿  Rating agencies’ independence and conflicts of interest avoidance; 
￿  CRAs’ responsibility towards investors and issuers; 
￿  Creation of a code of conduct in the field; 
￿  Shareholders’ independence and moral integrity; 
￿  Rating decision fundaments and its organizational structure. 
A series of names in the financial environment like Wilbur Ross, recognized 
as a rescuer of bankrupt companies, consider that short sellers played an important 
role in the current financial crisis, but the big part of the blame lay on rating agencies’ 
shoulders which rated companies’ stocks and their credit default swaps (Chasan, 
Ablan, 2008); as those ratings are public information, he even questions the reason of 
CRAs’ existence. At the moment when investors sell short a stock and its price falls, 
CRAs will assume that is something fundamental in the movement and will have to 
include this information in the rating process. This downgrading leads to a series of 
events whose finality is that financial institutions and companies will have to pay 
more for raising additional capital which can lead in the end to their demise. 
The conflict of interest that arises from the fact that issuers pay for ratings is 
even stronger as they are the main beneficiaries of the ratings and not the investors. 
Recent studies (Bolton, Freixas, Shapiro, 2008, p. 2) tried to issue a series of proposals 
for eliminating conflicts of interest within the field but results weren’t conclusive: 
￿  A bigger number of agencies will intensify competition but will offer 
more opportunities for issuers shopping for better ratings; 
￿  Advance payment of rating services will raise chances of a fair rating but 
will not stop investors to shop for ratings; 
￿  Switching to the model of ratings being paid by investors – as in US 
before 1970 – will raise “free-rider” problem.  Conflicts of interest’s management within credit rating agencies 
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  Financial Stability Forum report issued in March 2009 (London Summit, 
2009), as a foreword of G20 Summit held in London same year in April, proposed a 
series of solutions regarding rating activity: 
￿  Enhancing oversight on CRAs’ activity in order to prevent conflicts of 
interest; 
￿  A more strict internal regulation within CRAs to insure that the 
methodologies used in the rating process are viable; 
￿  Separation between rating activities and other business lines within CRAs 
(i.e. consultancy on debt structuring); 
￿  Restricting any link between managers’ compensations and their 
department performance; 





Practice shows the fact that even though conflicts of interest exists, they 
are hard to exploit; market can offer incentive for agencies to limit their actions 
that can create conflicts but can also reduce the value of their services when 
there is evidence of conflicts. As a reply, financial services providers issue 
internal regulations to reduce the incentives to exploit conflicts, trying to 
minimize reputational risk.  
One of the factors that contributed to blaming CRAs as the main drivers 
of the actual financial crisis was the conflict of interest through which the 
agencies, who were supposed to disseminate to the general public trustful 
information, had interest in hiding or distorting the reality for their own 
personal gain. The methods used for assessing the risks embedded by the new 
financial structures issued by companies left room for arguments and induced a 
suspicion regarding the methodology used in the rating process. 
Where conflicts were evident and perceived accordingly by the market, 
their exploitation will imply a reputational risk for the respective company 
whose demand for its services will decrease, thus its profitability. On the long 
run, losing its reputation represents a risk big enough for the company to try to 
avoid but on the short run this fact depends only on company’s transparency 
and its internal compensational structure. This fact can be found within CRAs 
that charge issuers fees for ratings; on short term, CRAs have the incentive to 
increase its customer base by giving them better ratings, thus helping the last 
ones to finance cheaper on capital markets. This business approach will lead 
inevitably to a loss in reputation making CRAs services less valuable. Management & Marketing 
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Another issue brought into spotlight by the recent financial crisis is that 
of the compensation mechanism of the personnel involved. Compensational 
structure within a company, if not properly assessed, will lead not only to 
conflicts of interest but to firm failure. 
As a conclusion of this paper and its underlying evidences, a series of 
recommendations can be made regarding control and elimination of conflicts of 
interest: 
￿  Enhancing transparency towards the potential conflicts of interest 
within rating agencies; 
￿  Issuing codes of conduct within agencies in cooperation with 
regulators; 
￿  Enhance oversight of the activities that show evidence of exploiting 
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